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Testing the Motor Simulation
Account of Source Errors for
Actions in Recall
Nicholas Lange*, Timothy J. Hollins and Patric Bach
School of Psychology, Plymouth University, Plymouth, United Kingdom
Observing someone else perform an action can lead to false memories of self-
performance – the observation inflation effect. One explanation is that action simulation
via mirror neuron activation during action observation is responsible for observation
inflation by enriching memories of observed actions with motor representations. In
three experiments we investigated this account of source memory failures, using a
novel paradigm that minimized influences of verbalization and prior object knowledge.
Participants worked in pairs to take turns acting out geometric shapes and letters. The
next day, participants recalled either actions they had performed or those they had
observed. Experiment 1 showed that participants falsely retrieved observed actions
as self-performed, but also retrieved self-performed actions as observed. Experiment
2 showed that preventing participants from encoding observed actions motorically by
taxing their motor system with a concurrent motor task did not lead to the predicted
decrease in false claims of self-performance. Indeed, Experiment 3 showed that this
was the case even if participants were asked to carefully monitor their recall. Because
our data provide no evidence for a motor activation account, we also discussed our
results in light of a source monitoring account.
Keywords: recall, action memory, enactment, source memory, source monitoring
INTRODUCTION
Many domestic arguments concern responsibility for actions, such as who last washed up or
who left a coffee stain. Lindner et al. (2010) discussed a specific case of memory confusion for
actions: the observation inflation effect. In a series of experiments, they reported that participants
consistently claimed actions as self-performed when they had merely observed someone else
perform those actions. Lindner et al. (2010) argued that observation inflation may emerge from
motor simulation during action observation. Accordingly, observing an action engages some of
the same neuronal populations as physically executing it (i.e., “mirror neurons,” Brass et al., 2000;
Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Bach et al., 2007, 2011; Oosterhof et al., 2013). While the specific
function of mirror activation is not clear (Csibra, 1993; Pfeifer et al., 2008; Rizzolatti and Fabbri-
Destro, 2008; Hickok, 2009; Bach et al., 2014c), it is normally assumed that observing an action
generates an internal replica of the same action, as if it had been self-performed (Grèzes and Decety,
2001; Jeannerod, 2001). Appropriation of observed actions therefore arises because the memory of
somebody else’s action not only contains a visual representation of what was observed, but also
a motor and proprioceptive representation similar to the memory one has of one’s own actions
(Lindner et al., 2010).
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Yet, confusion over the source of memories extends beyond
memory for actions. Imagination inflation (Garry et al., 1996)
is the increased belief in the occurrence of a merely imagined
autobiographical event, such as a medical procedure in childhood
(e.g., Mazzoni and Memon, 2003). People also confuse the source
of two externally experienced events, such as whether they heard
about a news story in the paper or on television (Johnson et al.,
1993). Most relevant to the observation inflation effect, people
have a tendency to claim others’ ideas as their own, an effect
labeled unconscious plagiarism or cryptomnesia (Brown and
Murphy, 1989; see Perfect and Stark, 2008, for a review). In the
prototypical study, participants take turns to generate solutions
to a problem. These range from simple verbal fluency tasks
(e.g., Brown and Murphy, 1989; Brown and Halliday, 1991) and
creativity tasks such as alternate uses for a brick (e.g., Stark
et al., 2005; Stark and Perfect, 2006, 2007) to real world problems
such as ways of reducing childhood obesity (Perfect et al., 2009).
When participants are asked to recall their own solutions, they
commonly incorporate solutions generated by their partners,
thereby claiming them as their own.
The unconscious plagiarism effect is in many ways analogous
to the observation inflation effect, and has been typically
explained using the source monitoring framework. Under this
account, the source of an item – from whom it originated –
is not encoded explicitly alongside an item but inferred at
retrieval using qualitative features encoded alongside the item,
such as cognitive, affective and perceptual information. Source
monitoring failures, such as participants falsely claiming a
partner-generated idea as their own, occur because participants
did not sufficiently encode those features, are not evaluating them
at retrieval, or because features do not clearly distinguish the two
sources (Johnson et al., 1993).
The source monitoring framework cannot only account for the
unconscious plagiarism error described above, but also predicts
that the reverse memory error would occur as well. Indeed,
recent work has shown that people do not only “steal” their
partner’s ideas, but also “donate” their own ideas. In Hollins
et al. (2016a), participants alternated generating solutions to
verbal fluency problems. Subsequently, when asked to recall their
own ideas, participants showed the well-known unconscious
plagiarism effect and included solutions generated by their
partner. However, they also produced the opposite error: when
asked to recall their partner’s ideas, they mistakenly reported
their own ideas. This occurred at about twice the rate that they
reported their partner’s ideas in the recall own task (see also
Hollins et al., 2016b). Unconscious plagiarism may therefore
reflect a more general confusion about the source of memory
that occurs when people seek to recall from one source whilst
excluding competing sources, in line with the source monitoring
framework. This raises the question whether actions are confused
in the same way, and if invoking motor system activation is
necessary to explain the observation inflation effect.
Thus, the current study tested the claim that motoric encoding
of observed actions via motor system activation is responsible
for false memories of self-performance (the observation inflation
effect). Before we can test the motor activation claim, we need
to establish if the observation inflation effect generalizes beyond
the paradigm used by Lindner et al. (2010). Lindner et al.
(2010)’s paradigm is a variation of the misinformation paradigm
(Loftus and Hoffman, 1989) that has previously been used to
investigate, for example, the imagination inflation effect (Goff
and Roediger, 1998). It consists of three phases. In a first
encoding phase, participants are shown action phrases such as
“Lift the pen” on a screen. Participants are instructed to read
all action phrases and enact a subset using the provided object.
In a second encoding phase, some of the previously presented
action phrases are presented a second time. Participants in the
‘observation’ condition now watch a video of an actor performing
the action phrases they have either read or performed themselves
in the first encoding phase. Participants in the ‘re-read’ condition
merely read the action phrases a second time. Two weeks later,
participants perform a two-phase recognition test. All action
phrases from the two encoding phases and some novel action
phrases are presented on a screen. For each action phrase,
participants decide whether the action phrase was presented at
encoding (i.e., is ‘old’) or is novel. When participants judge
an action phrase to be ‘old,’ they are asked to decide if they
performed the action phrase or merely read it in the first encoding
phase. Lindner et al. (2010) were interested in the extent to which
different types of additional encoding in the second encoding
phase would lead participants to claim they had performed those
actions when they had only read them in the first encoding phase.
They showed that observation in particular led to increased false
claims of performance compared to merely re-reading action
phrases. In other words, observation of previously encoded
action phrases biased participants’ source judgments in favor of
‘performed’ over ‘read’ responses.
Here, we tested whether observation would still lead to
false claims of self-performance if (a) observing someone else
perform an action was the only instance of encoding the
action (though note that in some variations of the observation
inflation paradigm, participants also show observation inflation
for novel actions), and if (b) the task at test was to recall
self-performed actions rather than make a source-monitoring
judgment. If observing actions generally results in false memories
of self-performance, we would, as the critical measure, expect
participants to falsely recall observed actions as self-performed.
To test the role of the motor trace in false memories of
self-performance, we modified the type of actions participants
performed. Lindner et al. (2010) asked participants to act out
action phrases. Source confusion here may be based on confusion
of the verbal in addition to the motor trace. We wanted to limit
verbal encoding to minimize source confusion resulting from
non-motor traces. Thus, rather than using action phrases, we
asked participants to use any part of their body or combination
of body parts to take turns performing actions in response to
shape cues. While action memory research has largely focused
on enactment of action phrases as in Lindner et al. (2010 for
review see Engelkamp, 1998; Nilsson, 2000), there are precedents
for investigating memory of body movements such as dance
moves and movement patterns (Smyth et al., 1988; Foley et al.,
1991; Helstrup, 2005). Even though these actions are non-object-
directed and unfamiliar, this should not affect potential motor
system activation. In fact, the seminal papers revealing motor
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activation during action observation in humans (e.g., Brass et al.,
2000; Stürmer et al., 2000; Calvo-Merino et al., 2004; Chong et al.,
2008; Oosterhof et al., 2010) used non-object directed actions,
and motoric activation during action observation is typically as
least as high for intransitive or unfamiliar actions (e.g., Press
et al., 2008; Hétu et al., 2011; Nicholson et al., 2017), which
minimize alternative non-motoric encoding strategies such as
merely memorizing the objects used, and using them as cues to
the actions associated with them (e.g., Decety et al., 1997; Rumiati
et al., 2005; Tessari et al., 2007).
Conceptually replicating the observation inflation effect in this
novel recall paradigm will allow us to test two predictions of the
motor simulation account of false memories of self-performance
after observation. First, we know from unconscious plagiarism
research that if asked to recall ideas, participants not only steal
partner’s ideas but also give away own ideas to a partner (Hollins
et al., 2016a,b). If source memory for actions conforms to the
same rules, we would expect participants to commit source errors
not only when they recall own actions, but to also commit them
when they recall actions they observed their partner perform. In
other words, in addition to observation leading to false memories
of self-performance, we expect that self-performance would also
lead to false memories of observation. In fact there is precedence
for false memories of performance and observation in source
recognition studies in the action memory domain (Hornstein and
Mulligan, 2004; Rosa and Gutchess, 2011; Leynes and Kakadia,
2013). In motor simulation views, however, only the former
“plagiarism” error is easy to explain. Action mirroring creates
a motor trace of the observed action that is added to its visual
memory representation. During recall, there is conflict between
visual and motoric memory traces, one suggesting observation
and the other self-performance, which causes some of the actions
to be misattributed. However, such views are hard-pressed to
account for the reverse error, where participants misattribute
an action to their partner that they had performed themselves.
For self-performed actions, both motoric- and visual-memory
indicate self-performance; there should thus never be a conflict
about the source of a self-performed action. Motor accounts
therefore predict a striking asymmetry: while people should
readily claim others’ actions as their own, they should very rarely
do the reverse. Second, under a mirror neuron network account
a disruption of the motor system – due to a secondary task
that taxes it – during observation should lead to a reduction in
observation inflation. Such effects of motor system load on action
observation and interpretation have been demonstrated before,
with concurrent motor execution either biasing (e.g., Tipper and
Bach, 2008) or disrupting the representation of observed actions
or of other visuospatial material (e.g., Quinn and Ralston, 1986; in
working memory, Smyth et al., 1988; Smyth and Pendleton, 1989;
Lawrence et al., 2001; Can et al., 2017; for a general review see,
Schütz-Bosbach and Prinz, 2007; Avenanti et al., 2013). We will
therefore test whether impaired motoric encoding of partner’s
actions, due to a taxed motor system, results in a reduction in
source errors when retrieving own actions.
In sum, the present study will test the following. In Experiment
1 we will determine whether the observation inflation effect
reported by Lindner et al. (2010) can be conceptually replicated
in a simpler experimental paradigm, which cannot be explained
on the basis of a verbal or object-based encoding of the actions.
This experiment will also provide a measure of the tendency
commit the reverse source error, i.e., to give away own actions.
Then in Experiments 2 and 3, we will test the further predictions
of a motor simulation account by investigating the impact of
concurrent motor and verbal loads during the encoding of
partner’s actions on source errors during the recall of own actions.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Participants
Thirty-seven members of the public participated for payment
of £8. Two participants were excluded from analysis for
not attending all sessions. The experiment was reviewed and
approved by the Plymouth University, School of Psychology
ethics committee. All participants gave written informed consent
in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Procedure
Participants attended the first session believing they were paired
with another naïve participant but in fact were paired with a
confederate. Participant and confederate were briefed together
by the experimenter and told they would take part in a memory
study, with the second session taking place the next day. In
the first session, participants completed the generation phase.
Participants were instructed that would have to act out a set of 15
shapes (A, C, F, H, I, J, K, L, O, P, T, V, X, 4, =), with any part of
their body or combination of body parts. The experimenter then
demonstrated six different ways a shape can be created with the
entire body or combination of body parts for a shape cue not used
in the experiment. Participants were cued with a printed label of
each shape. Members of the pair took turns generating actions
for each cue, interleaving performing and observing actions such
that performing an action in response to a cue was followed by
observing the other person perform an action in response to the
same cue. Each participant generated a total of 3 actions per cue,
resulting in 45 performed and 45 observed actions overall (see
Figure 1 for participants acting out the shape A). Participants
were told to observe their partners during partner-generation to
avoid duplicating exemplars that had already been created for a
cue. The participants were explicitly told to produce the shapes
so that they seemed correct from their perspective, and ignore
how they would look to their partner (i.e., confederate).
Confederates (n= 5) were briefed in full about the experiment
prior to their participation. They learned up to 15 ways each
shape could be made and were instructed to avoid duplicating the
participants’ actions.
The naïve participants returned a day later for the test phase.
Participants were shown the 15 shape labels one at a time in
random order. The Recall own group were asked to re-perform
the actions they had performed themselves and were warned
not to retrieve actions they saw the other person perform. The
Recall partner group was asked to re-perform the actions they had
observed their partner perform and were warned not to perform
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FIGURE 1 | Participants perform actions to represent the shape A.
actions they had generated themselves. Participants were asked
to re-perform as many exemplars from the appropriate source
(self or other) as they could remember for each of the shape cues,
working at their own pace.
Experimental Design
We manipulated the retrieval task at test in a between-subjects
manipulation (Recall own: N = 18; Recall partner: N = 17). Each
action retrieved by participants was coded as a correct recall,
a source error (the action was from the correct or incorrect
source for the task, respectively) or an intrusion error (the action
was not generated at encoding and therefore neither seen nor
performed). As we discuss in section “Analytic Approach,” our
focus is particularly on the number of source errors participants
committed in both retrieval tasks.
Action Coding
Photographs were taken of all actions performed during
generation and test for both participant and confederate. These
were coded by the experimenter (NL), using a coding scheme
developed in a pilot study. For each shape between 20 and
40 distinct solutions were identified and assigned categorized
numbers. The generation and retrieval phase were then coded
separately. Actions were coded as matching the action in
the coding scheme when participants performed the exact
movement. Crossing one’s forearms to make an X was coded
as a different action than crossing one’s arms at the elbows
to make an X, for example. It was necessary to distinguish
shapes in such a subtle manner, in order to rule out that
participants could simply remember in a verbal format how
the action were produced (e.g., making an X with the arms).
Pilot testing has shown that this task indeed causes participants
to perform their shapes repeatedly with the same body parts,
so that simple verbal encoding was impossible, or at least very
difficult.
To test the reliability of the coding scheme, a subset of the
photographs was coded by two independent raters naïve to the
purpose of the study and the condition of each participant.
The independent raters coded the photos for the first 20
participants, with one rater coding generation phase photographs
from the first half and test phase photographs from the second
half of those twenty participants, while the other rater coded
generation phase photographs from the second half and test
phase photographs from the first half of participants. Inter-rater
agreement between the experimenter and the two raters was 87
and 91% each, confirming the reliability of the coding scheme.
Subsequent analyses were solely based on the experimenter’s
judgments.
Analytic Approach
Each action retrieved by participants was coded as a correct
recall, a source error or an intrusion error. Table 1 shows the
frequency of those responses for all experiments. We will report
the conventional analyses of the effect of manipulations on
the frequency of correct responses, source errors and intrusion
errors, with source errors the focus of our interest. However,
one concern about source errors in any memory retrieval task
is that source errors might either be a genuine memory error
(the measure of interest) or simply a guess – an ad-hoc solution
generated during the retrieval task – that just happened to be an
item also generated at encoding. Source errors (i.e., false source
responses to items correctly recognized as old) are therefore often
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TABLE 1 | Full set of mean frequencies of reported responses (SDs in brackets) in Experiment 1 through 3 for both retrieval tasks and all concurrent load conditions.
Recall own Recall partner
No load Action planning load Motor execution load Verbal load No load Action planning load Motor execution load Verbal load
Experiment 1
Correct 23.78 – – – 15.94 – – –
Responses (3.81) (3.99)
Source 8.33 – – – 7.65 – – –
Errors (3.50) (5.30)
Intrusion 6.33 – – – 8.29 – – –
Errors (2.54) (3.14)
Experiment 2
Correct 6.89 6.37 6.37 – 4.72 3.50 3.78 –
Responses (2.56) (2.39) (2.06) (2.24) (1.29) (2.53)
Source 2.63 2.26 2.58 – 3.39 2.83 3.22 –
Errors (1.54) (1.37) (1.84) (2.00) (1.82) (1.83)
Intrusion 2.42 2.68 2.37 – 2.44 3.33 2.89 –
Errors (1.89) (1.83) (1.64) (1.79) (2.83) (2.42)
Experiment 3
Correct 8.21 7.21 – 7.00 5.21 3.68 – 3.37
Responses (2.04) (1.39) (2.24) (2.24) (2.19) (1.61)
Source 0.95 1.74 – 1.37 1.37 2.00 – 1.68
Errors (0.85) (1.59) (1.12) (0.83) (1.60) (1.34)
Intrusion 1.89 1.89 – 1.58 2.68 3.05 – 2.74
Errors (1.52) (1.63) (1.77) (1.45) (2.44) (1.56)
The maximum number of generated items per source and condition are 45 in Experiment 1 and 20 in Experiments 2 and 3.
analyzed in relation to false source responses to novel items
(i.e., false source responses to items falsely recognized as old)
by measuring either the difference or the ratio of both types of
errors.
Lindner et al. (2010) were interested in the specific effect
additional observation had on shifting participants’ response at
source test to falsely respond ‘performed.’ To show that the
observation inflation effect was not just an effect of guessing, they
contrasted the proportion of false ‘performed’ responses after
observation in the second encoding phase with the proportion
of false ‘performed’ responses for actions that had not been
presented in the second encoding phase. Their critical measure
was therefore the difference of false ‘performed’ responses when
those items had been additionally observed in contrast to when
they had not been observed. False ‘performed’ responses to
actions that had not been observed presents the baseline of
participants giving false ‘performed’ responses irrespective of
observing someone else perform those actions. The true effect of
observation in their metric is therefore the additional proportion
of false ‘performed’ responses observation results in beyond the
basic guessing error.
However, this metric cannot be easily transferred to our
recall task given the total number of responses at recall differs
by participants and observation is the sole encoding instance
of an action. We therefore developed a critical measure that
would similarly take accidental guessing into account and
look at an effect of observation beyond that, in conceptual
replication of Lindner et al.’s (2010) metric. We used a
Monte Carlo procedure to simulate how many source errors
participants would commit if they were guessing and had
just generated potential shapes for each symbol “on the fly”
during the test phase, rather than genuinely retrieving them
from what they had previously either seen or performed. The
simulation was based on the distribution of actions generated
by participants in the generation phase in response to the
shape cues. We simulated the test phase of the experiment
for each participant and each shape separately to take into
account differences between individual participants, differing
frequency profiles for the different shapes, and the typicality
of individual items. To achieve this, we used as much of the
participant-provided observed data as possible to ensure that
the only simulated part of the experiment would be the test
phase.
As a first step of the simulation process, we determined
frequency norms for the different actions generated for each of
the 15 shapes used in the experiment, from all participants who
took part in the encoding phase. Participants generated between
20 and 40 different ways of performing each shape across the
experiment, with some actions produced more frequently than
others. For each shape, we converted those frequency profiles
of the different actions into probability distributions, reflecting
the relative frequency that a particular action was produced for
a given shape. For each shape, the probabilities summed to 1 to
represent the entire action space.
We next applied these distributions to the observed test phase
for each participant. To simulate a participant’s performance
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we took the total number of actions they performed (i.e.,
reported at recall) for each shape in the test phase and randomly
selected this number of actions from the overall probability
distribution for that shape. This sampling was done without
replacement to match the experimental procedure of only
retrieving an item once. This provided us with an estimate of
which actions would most likely be chosen by a participant if
the participant had just generated novel solutions at test, i.e.,
guessed a number of unique items without memory, under the
assumption that these novel solutions at test would follow the
same frequency distribution as during the generation phase. We
then estimated how many of these novel (simulated) solutions
matched this participant’s self-generated actions, matched the
actions they observed their partner perform, or were neither seen
nor performed by this participant. We repeated the sampling
procedure 500 times for each participant to arrive at stable
estimates. As with the observed performance, we summed the
simulated performance across all shapes. Source errors were now
novel (simulated) solutions that happened to be partner actions
in the Recall own and self-generated actions in the Recall partner
task.
To estimate how many of the observed source errors were the
product of guessing we had to scale the simulated performance
to the observed performance, based on the number of intrusion
errors (actions that were not generated at encoding) committed
by participants in the test phase. The assumption here is that
intrusion errors must be the result of guessing (e.g., based on how
typical or common the actions are), because those actions do not
contain source-specifying information. We created the ratio of
simulated source errors over all simulated errors for the simulated
data for each participant (Eq. 1) and applied that ratio to that
participant’s observed data (Eq. 2) to estimate how many source
errors we would predict to observe if the participant was guessing
given the number of intrusion errors that particular participant
committed in the test phase. This gave us the number of predicted
source errors, i.e., an estimate of the number of source errors
we have to expect if recall was based on the probability of the
individual actions, in addition to the number of observed source
errors from the experiment.
Ratio = 1
500
500∑
i= 1
Source Errorssampled
Source Errorssampled+Novel actionssampled
(1)
Source Errorspredicted=Novel actionsobserved
∗ratio
1− ratio (2)
All subsequent analyses we performed were based on these data,
with data type (observed, predicted) used as a factor, i.e., in
Experiment 1 we can ask whether source errors (for Recall own
and Recall partner tasks) exceed the frequency we would expect
if participants were guessing. Given our theoretical questions, we
will focus on that aspect of the data but will briefly discuss the
conventional analyses of the data for a complete account of the
experimental results.
Results
Generation Phase
While participants were instructed to avoid duplicating their own
or their partner’s actions during generation, some participants
still committed such errors. On average, participants duplicated
0.51% (SD = 1.22%) of the actions they had already performed
themselves and 1.27% (SD = 1.81%) of actions performed by
the confederate. Confederates never duplicated their own actions
and mistakenly duplicated on average 0.57% (SD= 1.25%) of the
participant’s actions. Partner-duplicated actions were removed
from the experiment, and all subsequent analyses were restricted
to actions that had only been performed by one person.
Test Phase
We will first briefly describe the conventional analyses of
the data. Performance at retrieval (correct responses, source
errors, intrusion errors) was analyzed with multiple 2 Task
(Recall own, Recall partner) ANOVAs. Overall, more items were
correctly recalled in the Recall own than Recall partner task,
F(1,33) = 35.29, MSe = 15.21, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.517. There
was no evidence for a difference in the number of source errors
reported, F < 1, but novel intrusions occurred more often in the
Recall partner than Recall own task, F(1,33) = 4.15, MSe = 8.11,
p= 0.05, η2 = 0.112.
Next we turn our attention to the main purpose of our work,
and analyze the frequency of source errors observed versus that
predicted by guessing, as shown in Figure 2. Analyzing the data
as a 2 Task (Recall own, Recall partner)× 2 Data type (Observed,
Predicted) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the second
factor, shows no main effect of Task, F < 1, but, importantly, a
main effect of Data type, F(1,33)= 5.64, MSe= 12.53, p= 0.024,
η2p = 0.146. Source errors were observed more frequently than
predicted, demonstrating the hypothesized observation inflation
effect. However, there was no interaction between Task and
Data type, F(1,33) = 1.03, MSe = 10.80, p = 0.32, η2p = 0.030.
In subsequent step-down analyses, we tested whether observed
source errors were greater than predicted in each of the two
retrieval tasks, that is, whether both the “donating” and “stealing”
effects was observed (Perfect et al., 2009; Hollins et al., 2016a,b).
Indeed, observed frequencies surpassed predicted frequencies in
the Recall own task, t(17) = 3.92, p < 0.001, dav = 1.28 and in
the Recall partner task, t(16) = 1.84, p = 0.042, dav = 0.59, both
one-tailed.
Discussion
We successfully conceptually replicated the observation inflation
effect of Lindner et al. (2010) in a new paradigm. Using a single
encoding phase and non-verbalisable actions, we found false
free-recall of observed actions as being self-performed, ruling
out that the effect merely reflects an enhanced verbal or object
based encoding of the seen actions. Importantly, however, we
also observed the opposite effect: the tendency to attribute self-
performed actions to a partner. This is in line with reports of
participants giving away ideas in the verbal domain (Perfect et al.,
2009; Hollins et al., 2016a,b) and action domain (Hornstein and
Mulligan, 2004; Rosa and Gutchess, 2011; Leynes and Kakadia,
2013).
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FIGURE 2 | Frequent of observed and predicted source errors in the Recall
own and Recall partner task in Experiment 1. The error bars are 95%
within-subjects confidence intervals.
This latter effect argues against a simple motor activation
account of observation inflation, according to which no
confusion should arise for self-performed actions because
both visual and motoric memories indicate self-performance.
However, while there was no significant difference, Figure 2
shows that the effect in the Recall own task was greater than in the
Recall partner task. This pattern would be in line with predictions
of motor theories of observation inflation (e.g., Lindner et al.,
2010) while the reverse error may only be an artifact of guessing
processes. Thus, while the reverse error exists clearly for verbal
material (Hollins et al., 2016a,b), it may not for actions.
Alternatively, the less robust effect in the Recall partner task
may emerge from using confederates. Confederates were shown
possible actions beforehand and took part in the experiment
repeatedly. They may have therefore performed the shapes
in a more pronounced and/or prototypical way than naïve
participants’. In fact, some naïve participants did report that they
suspected they had been paired with a confederate from how
the confederate performed the actions. It is therefore possible
that knowledge of the confederates or the quality of confederates’
performance would influence the memory performance at test.
When looking for own actions, observed actions that were
performed quite clearly and confidently may be more strongly
represented in memory and intrude as source errors.
To prevent this potential influence, we paired two naïve
participants in Experiment 2. If Experiment 2 shows a similar
asymmetry, we would have to assume that the difference in effect
size is a function of the retrieval task. In contrast, if the difference
emerged from the potentially biased action production of the
confederates, it should now be eliminated. Experiment 2 also
more directly tested the motor simulation account of observation
inflation by means of a concurrent load during encoding.
EXPERIMENT 2
According to motor system activation views, observation
inflation arises because participants’ motor systems resonate with
the actions they observe and produce an internal replica of
the action, as if it were self-performed (Craighero et al., 1999,
2002). Occupying the motor system with a secondary motor task
should therefore prevent the formation of such traces. Indeed,
several studies show that secondary motor task bias or disrupt
the formation of action representations or motor plans (cf.
Vetter and Wolpert, 2000; Zwickel et al., 2007; Tipper and Bach,
2008; Bach et al., 2014a), and the representation of visuospatial
material and its encoding in working memory (e.g., Quinn and
Ralston, 1986; Smyth et al., 1988; Smyth and Pendleton, 1989;
Lawrence et al., 2001; Can et al., 2017; for a general review see,
Schütz-Bosbach and Prinz, 2007). Memories lacking the mirrored
motoric information should be less likely to be confused for
self-performed actions. In fact, Lindner et al. (2016) recently
showed that claims of self-performance after observation were
reduced when participants had performed incongruent rather
than congruent actions while watching them.
Thus, in Experiment 2, we asked participants to execute
simple motor behaviors at the same time as they observed
their partner’s actions. This motor performance should interfere
with the encoding of motor representations of observed actions,
leaving only the visual-perceptual component of the memory
trace. We used two types of motor system load to compare
against a no load control condition. First, a whole-body motor
execution load task was used to directly engage execution-related
motor resources, in line with Lindner et al. (2016). Participants
were asked to walk in place, swinging their arms, as they
watched their partner perform an action. These whole body
movements should interfere with the generation of any motor
representation of the observed action, irrespective of the body
part(s) used. Similar motor tasks have been shown to disrupt
recall of action phrases (Saltz and Donnenwerth-Nolan, 1981;
Smyth et al., 1988; Helstrup, 2001), the encoding of visuospatial
material in working memory (Quinn and Ralston, 1986; Smyth
and Pendleton, 1989; Lawrence et al., 2001; Can et al., 2017),
or the acquisition of motor skills during mental practice and
imitation learning (Bach et al., 2014a). Indeed, prior research
has shown that concurrent motor performance affects perception
of non-biological and biological action stimuli (for reviews, see
Schütz-Bosbach and Prinz, 2007; Avenanti et al., 2013), leading
to reductions in subsequent action judgments (Bach and Tipper,
2007; Tipper and Bach, 2008), and interpretations (Vetter and
Wolpert, 2000; Hamilton et al., 2004) when produced actions are
different from what is currently observed. If motor simulation
underlies observation inflation, participants should therefore
report fewer partner actions falsely as their own if motoric
activation is disrupted due to this secondary task. In contrast,
no such difference should be observed if the effects emerge from
general source confusion processes outside the motor system.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 September 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 1686
fpsyg-08-01686 September 26, 2017 Time: 17:47 # 8
Lange et al. Source Memory for Actions
Second, we used an action planning load task to engage
higher-level spatial or action planning resources. We asked
participants to remember Corsi-block sequences whilst they
watched their partner perform an action. In the Corsi-block task,
the experimenter taps a spatial path on a random sequence of
blocks arranged on a board. The participant is then asked to
reproduce the sequence of taps in the same order. To estimate
a participant’s span, the length of the sequence increases until the
participant is no longer able to repeat the sequence in the correct
order. The length of sequence participants last produced correctly
is commonly referred to as participants’ visual-spatial working
memory span (Milner, 1971). Action planning is typically
assumed to rely on such a visuospatial encoding of the action
one intends to perform (Hommel et al., 2001; Hesse and Franz,
2009). It has been argued that mirror neuron activation might
not reflect only a motoric encoding of the actions, but also
such planning processes (e.g., Csibra and Gergely, 2007; Hickok,
2009; Bach et al., 2014c). Neuroimaging studies show activation
during movement planning in the prefrontal, posterior parietal
and premotor cortex (Hanakawa et al., 2008; Ikkai and Curtis,
2011), some of the regions implicated in mirror neuron activation
(Iacoboni et al., 2001; Koski et al., 2001). The Corsi task has
been known for a long time to lead to mutual interference effects
in tasks that require visuospatial processing (e.g., Smyth and
Scholey, 1994; Della Sala et al., 1999; Vandierendonck et al., 2004;
for a review, see Zimmer, 2008).
To test for the possibility that action confusability emerged
from such action planning (rather than low-level motor) traces
of the actions, we asked participants to remember Corsi-
block sequences whilst they watched their partner perform an
action. The participant was asked to reproduce the sequence
after observing their partner perform an action, meaning the
participant had to encode the spatial path tapped by the
experimenter as an action intention for later reproduction. Since
intentions for future action production are encoded motorically
(Brandimonte and Passolunghi, 1994; Freeman and Ellis, 2003;
Gallivan et al., 2011) and kept in working memory until actions
are executed (Ohbayashi et al., 2003), we expect the motor system
to be occupied with that action plan for future performance
during observation of partner’s actions.
According to motor simulation views of observation inflation,
either or both types of concurrent motor system activity should
reduce motor simulation of observed actions and subsequently
reduce the number of observed actions falsely recalled as self-
performed.
As a direct consequence of the theoretical predictions,
the experimental design in Experiment 2 was unbalanced.
Concurrent load could only be directly applied to observed
actions, not to performed actions. Since concurrent load was
applied to blocks of trials, nominally there will be performed
actions encoded in Action planning load or Motor execution
load blocks, but self-performance of actions always took place
without a concurrent load. Any effects of concurrent load on
performed actions in those blocks can therefore not be directly
an effect of any concurrent load but may be an effect of, for
example, encoding context, attention or distraction resulting
from switching between target and concurrent load tasks. We
will first report the full analysis, looking at all trials of performed
and observed actions in the concurrent load blocks. Given the
imbalance in the design, we will then specifically analyze the
subset of data we manipulated directly and have theoretical
predictions about.
Method
Participants
Forty members of the public participated for payment of £12.
Three participants did not attend all sessions and their data
were excluded from the analysis. The experiment was reviewed
and approved by the Plymouth University, School of Psychology
ethics committee. All participants gave written informed consent
in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Procedure
Participants attended the first session in pairs. Prior to the
experiment, each participant’s Corsi-block span was assessed. The
length of the tapped sequence was increased up to the point
that participants failed to correctly reproduce the sequence twice.
Participants’ span was the maximum length of sequence they
successfully reproduced twice. Participants were given the same
instructions as in Experiment 1 to create exemplars for 15 shape
cues with any part of their body or combination of body parts. We
asked participants to create 4, not 3 exemplars as in Experiment
1, to compensate for the addition of concurrent load conditions.
The 15 cues were split into 3 blocks of five cues each, with a
concurrent load (Action planning, Motor execution) added to the
action observation trials for two of those blocks (assignment of
cues to concurrent load conditions and order of those conditions
was counterbalanced across participants), and no load to the
remaining block. Participants now performed 20 and observed
20 actions in each of the 3 concurrent load conditions. In
the Action planning load condition, participants were shown
a Corsi-block sequence at their span prior to observing their
partner perform an action, then asked to reproduce the sequence
after the observation. In the Motor execution load condition,
participants were asked to walk in place, with exaggerated
movement of both arms and legs, as they observed their
partner. Performance of own actions always took place under no
load.
Participants returned to retrieve either their own or their
partner’s actions the next day, with the retrieval task identical
to Experiment 1. Responses were scored and analyzed as in
Experiment 1.
Experimental Design
As in Experiment 1, we manipulated the retrieval task at
test between-subjects (Recall own: N = 19; Recall partner:
N = 18). Additionally, we manipulated the concurrent load
during observation within-subjects (No load, Action planning
load, Motor execution load for 5 cues each). Thus in the
Recall own task, participants recalled actions they had performed
themselves without a secondary load, while avoiding reporting
actions they had observed under no load, an action planning
load and a motor execution load. In the Recall partner task,
participants recalled actions they had observed under no load, an
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action planning load and a motor execution load, while avoiding
reporting actions they had performed under no load. Since we
manipulated concurrent load only during observation of actions,
we will focus on the effects of concurrent load on the false
retrieval of observed actions in the Recall own task.
Results
Generation Phase
Concurrent load had no impact on the tendency for participants
to repeat their own actions (No load: M = 5.13%, SD = 5.75%;
Action planning load: M = 5.54%, SD = 7.42%; Motor load:
M = 6.35%, SD = 6.11%), F < 1. However, concurrent load
did influence the tendency to duplicate a partners actions
(No load: M = 9.73%, SD = 6.25; Action planning load:
M = 13.78%, SD = 7.75%; Motor load: M = 12.16%,
SD= 6.93%), F(2,72)= 3.37, MSe= 1.83, p= 0.040, η2p = 0.086,
(with Bonferroni-adjustment, none of the individual pairwise
comparisons differed significantly). For the analysis of retrieval
performance, only those items that had only been performed by
one of the participants in the pair were included.
Test Phase
Performance at retrieval (correct responses, source errors,
intrusion errors) was analyzed as multiple 2 Task (Recall own,
Recall partner) × 3 Concurrent load (No load, Action planning
load, Motor execution load) ANOVAs with repeated measures on
the second factor.
Correct recall was higher in the Recall own than Recall partner
task, F(1,35) = 17.64, MSe = 3.39, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.335.
There was a main effect of concurrent load, F(2,70) = 3.49,
MSe = 2.34, p = 0.036, η2p = 0.091, with Bonferroni-adjusted
pairwise comparisons not showing a significant difference
between concurrent load conditions, though testing the control
condition against the average of the two load conditions shows
that correct recall was lower when actions were observed under
load, F(1,35) = 6.29, MSe = 23.95, p = 0.017, η2p = 0.152.The
interaction was not significant, F < 1.
For source errors, there were no significant effects of Task,
F(1,35) = 2.10, MSe = 1.90, p = 0.16, η2p = 0.057, or Concurrent
load, F(2,70) = 1.27, MSe = 1.7, p = 0.29, η2p = 0.035, nor was
there a significant interaction, F < 1. Similarly, intrusions errors
did not show main effects of Task, F < 1, or Concurrent load,
F(2,70) = 1.41, MSe = 2.22, p = 0.25, η2p = 0.039. There was no
significant interaction, F < 1.
As in Experiment 1, we will now turn to the comparison of
the rates of source errors observed versus predicted by guessing.
Participants generated fewer items per condition in Experiment
2 than Experiment 1. This resulted in fewer errors in absolute
terms, but the error rates were equivalent in both experiments
with 19% of partner actions and 17% of self-generated actions
reported as source errors in Experiment 1 compared to 15 and
19%, respectively, in Experiment 2.
We first compared source errors in the Recall own and Recall
partner task as in Experiment 1, to test the prediction of the
motor simulation account that more source errors would be made
when recalling own rather than partner actions. Since concurrent
load was manipulated only when participants observed their
FIGURE 3 | Frequency of observed and predicted source errors in the Recall
own and Recall partner task in Experiment 2 for the no concurrent load
condition. The error bars are 95% within-subjects confidence intervals.
partner’s actions, only the no concurrent load condition was used
in this comparison. A 2 Task (Recall own, Recall partner) × 2
Data type (Observed, Predicted) mixed ANOVA with repeated
measures on the second factor did not reveal a main effect of
Task, F(1,35) = 1.01, MSe = 2.59, p = 0.32, η2p = 0.028. As in
Experiment 1, source errors were observed more frequently than
predicted from guessing, F(1,35)= 30.46, MSe= 1.67, p< 0.001,
η2p = 0.465. The interaction was not significant, F(1,35) = 1.61,
MSe = 1.67, p = 0.21, η2p = 0.044. Step-down analyses showed
that observed errors surpassed predicted errors in both retrieval
tasks, see Figure 3, but the effect was smaller in the Recall own
task, t(18) = 3.15, p = .003, dav = 0.98, than the Recall partner
task, t(17) = 4.58, p < 0.001, dav = 1.26, both one-tailed. This
means that the higher rate of errors in the Recall own task in
Experiment 1 was not replicated here with naïve participants.
We then tested whether concurrent (action planning or
motor execution) load would reduce source errors in the
Recall own task, as shown in Figure 4. We analyzed the
data for the Recall own group with a 2 Data type (Observed,
Predicted) × 3 Concurrent load (No load, Action planning load,
Motor execution load) repeated measures ANOVA. As before,
source errors were observed more frequently than predicted
from guessing, F(1,18) = 22.57, MSe = 1.77, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.556. There was no evidence for an effect of Concurrent
load nor was there a significant interaction, both Fs < 1. In
subsequent step-down analyses, we tested whether observed
source errors were greater than predicted in every concurrent
load condition. Observed frequencies significantly surpassed
predicted frequencies in the Control, t(18) = 3.15, p = 0.003,
dav = 0.98, Action planning load, t(18) = 2.73, p = 0.007,
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FIGURE 4 | Frequency of observed and predicted source errors in the Recall
own task in Experiment 2 for all concurrent load conditions. The error bars are
95% within-subjects confidence intervals.
dav = 0.81, and Motor execution load condition, t(18) = 2.55,
p= 0.010, dav = 0.91, all comparisons one-tailed.
Discussion
Experiment 2 replicates the results of Experiment 1. Both
observation inflation and the reverse error of falsely recalling self-
performed actions occurred more frequently than expected from
guessing. If anything, source errors were more frequent in the
Recall partner than the Recall own task. This suggests that the
smaller effect in the Recall partner task in Experiment 1 was due
to the use of confederates. Even though the difference was not
significant, it is in line with our prior work in the verbal domain
that has similarly shown higher rates for giving away compared
to stealing ideas (Hollins et al., 2016a,b).
This pattern of bidirectional source errors in Experiment 2 is
not consistent with a motor simulation account of observation
inflation. Motor traces generated during action observation
would only predict observation inflation, not giving away self-
performed actions to the partner. In addition, such views would
predict that motor load during action observation should lead to
fewer of those actions being falsely retrieved as self-performed, as
own motor execution should interfere with generating motoric
memory traces. We found no evidence for this account. Neither
the motor load, nor the action planning load, decreased source
errors. This was not because source errors were at floor. Source
errors surpassed predicted frequencies in each load condition
quite substantially (d > 0.81 in all conditions).
Because we did not observe an effect of concurrent load,
it is possible that the manipulation we used had no effect on
encoding of observed actions. Note though that similar tasks
have been used before to interfere with motoric encoding of
observed actions (for reviews see Schütz-Bosbach and Prinz,
2007; Avenanti et al., 2013). Indeed, we did see that concurrent
load increased partner-duplications at generation, consistent
with its demonstrated effect on working memory (Quinn and
Ralston, 1986; Smyth and Pendleton, 1989; Lawrence et al., 2001;
Can et al., 2017), and decreased correct recall of partner actions
[this simple effect was marginally significant, F(2,34) = 3.17,
MSe = 2.33, p = 0.055, η2p = 0.157]. This means, while there
was no evidence for the predicted effect of the manipulation on
source errors in the Recall own task, the manipulation did affect
participants’ performance in the experiment overall.
Another possibility is that the free report task we chose as the
memory test cannot clearly reflect an effect of the manipulation
on source confusion specifically. To make source judgments in
a free recall task, participants first have to generate an action
and then decide to report or withhold that action from report,
depending on whether the inferred source matches the task
requirement (recall own or recall partner). Participants’ report
therefore conflates generation of solutions and source decisions
about these solutions, both of which can be separately affected
by experimental manipulations. It is therefore possible that
participants in a free report simply neglect the source of retrieved
actions and report all actions that come to mind without engaging
in explicit monitoring of the source. Even though our calculations
suggest that guessing cannot account for the source errors we
observed, forcing participants to consider items more carefully
may reveal an effect of the concurrent load manipulation on
observation inflation. The retrieval task in Experiment 3 was
therefore changed to instruct participants to inspect every action
they reported at retrieval for source-appropriateness.
A third possibility is that the cognitive load introduced by the
secondary task affected participants’ ability to sufficiently encode
the actions they observed. In that case, it would be plausible
that such resource depletion would increase source errors while
the motor component of the secondary task prevented motor
simulation and decreased source errors. In that case, we would
have expected to see that source errors were in total lower in
the motor execution than the action planning load condition.
We found no evidence for that. In Experiment 3, we will test
this possibility explicitly and introduce a non-motor task with
high cognitive load to compare against the action planning
load.
EXPERIMENT 3
Experiment 2 did not show the reduction in source errors
predicted by a motor simulation account of observation inflation.
It is, however, possible that participants simply neglected to
consider the source of actions at retrieval and simply reported
everything that came to mind as they completed the standard
free report task. The retrieval task in Experiment 3 was therefore
separated into two separate stages, following an extended recall
procedure developed by Bousfield and Rosner (1970), and more
recently used by Kahana et al. (2005) and Hollins et al. (2016a). As
in the these tasks, we asked participants to perform all actions that
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came to mind when asked to recall either own or partner actions.
For each action performed, participants were then explicitly
asked to consider its source carefully and to decide whether or
not it was compliant with their retrieval goal (i.e., to recall their
own or their partner’s actions). The actions that participants
reported are therefore only those they had explicitly attributed
to the required source.
Additionally, we replaced the motor execution load from
Experiment 2 with a verbal load task to be able to pinpoint
a specific motor load effect compared to a generic cognitive
one. While a comparison of motor execution to verbal
load may be interesting, both loads differ in their cognitive
difficulty, confounding difficulty and modality-specifics. The
Action planning load task, on the other hand, should be of
comparative task difficulty to the verbal load task for participants
since they are tested at span if both cases. If source errors are
due to motor planning processes, then we would expect to see
a reduction of false reports of partner actions as self-performed
only under concurrent action planning but not concurrent verbal
load. In contrast, if they emerge from a more general source, both
loads should affect source errors equally.
Method
Participants
Forty-two members of the public participated for payment of
£12. Four participants did not attend all sessions and their data
were excluded from the analysis. The experiment was reviewed
and approved by the Plymouth University, School of Psychology
ethics committee. All participants gave written informed consent
in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Procedure
Prior to the experiment, each participant’s Corsi block-tapping
span and forward digit span were assessed. The Action planning
load condition was identical to Experiment 2. The Motor
execution load condition from Experiment 2 was replaced by a
Verbal load condition. Participants heard a sequence of digits at
their individual span prior to observing their partner perform
an action and were asked to reproduce the sequence after
their partner completed their action. Concurrent load was only
administered during observations of partner actions, not during
execution of own actions. As in Experiment 2, participants
generated 4 exemplars each in response to 15 shape cues split
over 3 concurrent load conditions. Participants returned the
next day individually for an extended recall task. They were
instructed to retrieve and re-perform either their own actions
or those they had observed their partner perform the previous
day. They were told that, as they tried to remember their own
(or their partner’s) actions, other actions may come to mind such
as their partner’s actions when they had to remember their own
actions, or entirely new ways of performing each shape. They
were encouraged to perform everything that came to mind as
they tried to remember their own (or their partner’s) actions,
and to indicate verbally for each action whether it was a target
action or not. They were not instructed to search their memory
for actions from both sources, nor to generate entirely new
actions.
Experimental Design
As in Experiment 1, we manipulated the retrieval task at
test in a between-subjects manipulation (Recall own: N = 19;
Recall partner: N = 19). Additionally, we manipulated the
concurrent load during observation within-subjects (No load,
Action planning load, Verbal load for 5 cues each). As in
Experiments 1 and 2, we will focus on contrasting observed
source errors with those predicted by guessing. Since we
manipulated concurrent load only during observation of actions,
we will focus on the effects of concurrent load on the false
retrieval of observed actions in the Recall own task.
Results
Generation Phase
Unlike Experiment 2, there was a main effect of Concurrent load
on participants repeating their own actions (No load: M= 2.63%,
SD = 4.15%; Action planning load: M = 4.87%, SD = 6.09%;
Verbal load: M = 5.66%, SD = 7.28%), F(2,74) = 5.02,
MSe = 0.75, p = 0.009, η2p = 0.120, with Bonferroni-adjusted
comparisons showing that participants repeated more of their
own actions in concurrent load conditions (Action planning load,
p = 0.033; Verbal load, p = 0.023) compared to the no load
condition. As in Experiment 2, participants more often copied
partner’s actions under load, but this effect was not significant
here (No load: M = 8.68%, SD = 6.75%; Action planning load:
M = 10.66%, SD= 7.90%; Verbal load: M = 11.05%, SD= 7.98),
F(2,74)= 1.12, MSe= 2.45, p= 0.33, η2p = 0.029. For the analysis
of retrieval performance, only those items that had only been
performed by one of the participants in the pair were included.
Test Phase
We will again first report the conventional analyses for the actions
participants report at retrieval. Participants’ responses at retrieval
(correct responses, source errors, intrusion errors) were analyzed
as multiple 2 Task (Recall own, Recall partner) × 3 Concurrent
load (No load, Action planning load, Verbal load) ANOVAs with
repeated measures on the second factor.
Correct responses were more frequent in the Recall own than
Recall partner task, F(1,36) = 41.99, MSe = 2.59, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.538. As in Experiment 2, there was a main effect of
Concurrent load, F(1.707,61.453)= 9.02, MSe= 3.28, p= 0.001,
η2p = 0.200. Pairwise Bonferroni-adjusted comparisons showed
that while each of the two load conditions led to fewer
correct actions being reported than the control condition (both
p = 0.001), the two load conditions did not differ from one
another, p= 1. There was no interaction, F < 1.
For source errors, there was no main effect of Task,
F(1,36) = 1.56, MSe = 0.68, p = 0.22, η2p = 0.041, but a main
effect of Concurrent load, F(2,72)= 3.52, MSe= 1.37, p= 0.035,
η2p = 0.089, with Bonferroni-adjusted comparisons showing that
source errors were more frequent in the Action planning load
than the No load condition (p = 0.047), with the remaining
comparisons not significant, ps > 0.43. There was no significant
interaction, F < 1.
Intrusion errors were more frequent in the Recall partner
than Recall own task, F(1,36) = 8.39, MSe = 3.64, p = 0.006,
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FIGURE 5 | Frequency of observed and predicted source errors in the Recall
own and Recall partner task in Experiment 3 for the no concurrent load
condition. The error bars are 95% within-subjects confidence intervals.
η2p = 0.189. There was no effect of Concurrent load nor was there
an interaction, both Fs < 1.
To turn to our measures of interest, we contrasted the rate
of source errors observed versus predicted from guessing as in
Experiments 1 and 2. As in Experiment 2, we first compared
observed and predicted source errors in the Recall own and Recall
partner task, when all actions were encoded without a concurrent
load (see Figure 5). We analyzed the data with a 2 Task (Recall
own, Recall partner) × 2 Data type (Observed, Predicted) mixed
ANOVA with repeated measures on the second factor. There
was a main effect of Task reflecting that source errors more
likely in the Recall partner than Recall own task, F(1,36) = 5.27,
MSe = 0.54, p = 0.028, η2p = 0.128. However, there was no
evidence that source errors were observed more frequently than
predicted from guessing, F(1,36) = 1.35, MSe = 0.49, p = 0.25,
η2p = 0.036, nor was there an interaction, F < 1. Separate analyses
showed that in fact observed frequencies did not significantly
surpass predicted frequencies in either Recall own, t(18) = 0.75,
p= 0.23, dav = 0.21 or Recall partner task, t(18)= 0.89, p= 0.19,
dav = 0.31, both one-tailed.
We next tested the effect of concurrent load on source errors
committed in the Recall own task only, as shown in Figure 6. We
analyzed the data as a 2 Data type (Observed, Predicted) × 3
Concurrent load (No load, Action planning load, Verbal load)
repeated measures ANOVA. Source errors were committed
more frequently than predicted, F(1,18) = 10.16, MSe = 1.04,
p = 0.005, η2p = 0.361. There was no evidence for an overall
effect of Concurrent load, F(2,36) = 2.16, MSe = 0.62, p = 0.13,
η2p = 0.107. The interaction was not significant, F(2,36) = 2.05,
MSe= 0.83, p= 0.14, η2p = 0.102.
FIGURE 6 | Frequency of observed and predicted source errors in the Recall
own task in Experiment 3 for all concurrent load conditions. The error bars are
95% within-subjects confidence intervals.
In subsequent step-down analyses, we tested whether observed
source errors were greater than predicted source errors in every
concurrent load condition. Observed frequencies significantly
surpassed predicted frequencies in the Action planning load,
t(18) = 2.61, p = 0.009, dav = 0.82, and Verbal load condition,
t(18) = 2.18, p = 0.021, dav = 0.74, but not in the Control
condition, t(18) = 0.75, p = 0.23, dav = 0.21, all comparisons
one-tailed.
Discussion
Experiment 3 shows a similar pattern of data to Experiments 1
and 2, in that participants falsely recalled observed actions as
self-performed and self-performed actions as observed to similar
degrees. However, in the no load conditions, in contrast to the
previous experiments, source errors of either kind did not occur
more frequently than guessing in the control condition.
In addition, the motor simulation account predicts that
performing a visuospatial or motor task concurrent to
observation of actions should decrease source errors compared
to observing actions without a concurrent task (e.g., Lindner
et al., 2010, 2016), or compared to a task without a visuomotor
component, such as the verbal load task used here. Experiment
3 disconfirms this prediction. Source errors were higher than
predicted from guessing for both the motor load and the verbal
load conditions and were, if anything, more frequent in the
verbal load condition.
Thus, Experiment 3 provides interesting data for the impact
of monitoring processes on source errors during the recall
of action memories. While false retrieval of observed actions
as self-performed exceeded guessing in the concurrent load
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conditions, the same was not true in the control condition. In
fact, in the control conditions, source errors committed in either
retrieval task did not exceed guessing. This suggests that careful
monitoring of the source-appropriateness at recall in the test
phase may be able to reduce the source memory error committed
at retrieval under certain circumstances.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Meta-Analysis of the Three Experiments
The observation inflation effect (Lindner et al., 2010) is the
false retrieval of observed actions as being self-performed and
has been attributed to motor simulation due to mirror neuron
network activation during observation. We tested (1) whether
we can conceptually replicate the observation inflation effect
with a simpler paradigm that rules out verbal and object-based
encoding of the actions, (2) whether there is a complementary,
reverse error during the retrieval of partner’s actions, and
(3) whether motor system loads during observation reduce
the observation inflation effect. So far we have presented
results separately for all three experiments. As we pointed
out earlier, the imprecision is high (the power low) in some
of the single data points, making conclusive interpretation of
the overall effect difficult. We therefore integrated the data
across experiments into two forest plots (Cumming, 2012)
as such a meta-analytic approach should be less affected by
noise than the individual studies. Rather than looking at
individual comparisons, we can now look at summary effects
that contain the effects of the individual comparisons, with more
precise effect size estimates contributing more to the summary
effect.
With respect to our first two questions the results are clear.
Figure 7 shows the memory error effects for the control (no
load) conditions for all three experiments relative to guessing
performance at 0. Summary effect sizes for the Recall own and
Recall partner task, given at the bottom of the figure, reveal two
clear effects. First, both observation inflation and the reverse
error – reporting own actions as those of the partner – occur
reliably more often than predicted from guessing. Second, the
confidence intervals for the two errors overlap considerably.
At present, therefore, there is no evidence to suggest that one
form of error is more frequent than the other. We therefore
not only successfully demonstrated that the observation inflation
effect can be replicated in a simpler recall paradigm that is less
vulnerable to effects of verbalization and ambiguous source, but
that there is complementary reverse error. This argues against
motor activation views of observation inflation, according to
which to potential for source-confusion should exist specifically
for observed actions, but not self-performed ones.
Our third question was whether a motor system load at
encoding would reduce the magnitude of the observation
inflation effect. Motor activation views suggest that occupying
the motor system would undermine the formation of self-
related representations of the partner’s actions, and therefore
reduce source errors. We therefore investigated participants’
false recall of their partner’s actions depending upon whether
they were under any motor load at encoding or not. The
summary statistics in Figure 7 support two clear conclusions.
First, across experiments, there is a robust observation inflation
FIGURE 7 | Standardized mean change between observed and predicted source errors committed in Experiments 1 through 3 in both the Recall own and Recall
partner task when action were encoded without a concurrent load. Size of the squares represents the weights of the individual comparisons. The error bars are 95%
confidence interval. The polygons represent the summary effects (fixed effects) of the Recall own and the Recall partner task, respectively, across all three
experiments.
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effect regardless of concurrent load. Second, the data do not
support the predicted reduction in observation inflation with a
motor load: the confidence intervals on the summary statistics
of the control and motor load conditions overlap considerably,
with the overall pattern suggesting a slight increase in errors with
motor load, rather than the predicted decrease.
Finally, Figure 8 allows closer comparison of the results
in Experiment 3 relative to the prior experiments. The main
difference between Experiments 3 and 2 was the change in
retrieval task instruction that required participants to carefully
examine the actions they were reporting. Rather than examining
Experiment 3 in isolation, we can now ask if the change in
retrieval task instruction replicated the effect of Experiment 2.
We used a Bayesian approach, employing the Dienes (2008)
protocol and using the Jeffreys (1961) guidelines for interpreting
Bayes Factors. The advantage of the Bayesian approach to data
analysis is that it allows specification of an exact expected effect
size based on prior information (in this case, Experiment 2)
compared to a null effect (source errors do not exceed guessing),
and provides an estimate of the extent to which the evidence
(Experiment 3 data) support either of these two hypotheses.
The evidence is judged to be inconclusive if neither hypothesis
is clearly favored due to, for example, a lack of power in the
experiment.
We first compared the no load condition in both the Recall
own and Recall partner retrieval task from Experiment 3 to the
matching condition in Experiment 2. The prior for the Recall
own task was defined by the effect in Experiment 2 with a half-
normal distribution, i.e., one-tailed, with M = 0, SD = 1.28.
The data was defined by the effect in Experiment 3 with a
sample mean of M = 0.15 and SE = 0.20. The prior for the
Recall partner task was defined by the effect in Experiment 2
with a half-normal distribution, i.e., one-tailed, with M = 0,
SD = 2.04. The data was defined by the effect in Experiment 3
with a sample mean of M = 0.22 and SE = 0.25. This resulted in
Bayes Factors of 0.32 for the Recall own and 0.29 for the Recall
partner task. This means that the data in Experiment 3 provide
3 and 4 times more evidence, respectively, in favor of a null
memory error effect than in favor of a replication of the effect
in Experiment 2. This suggests that careful monitoring reduced
memory errors effect when recalling actions observed without a
load.
We next compared the action planning load condition in
the Recall own task across the two experiments. The prior
was defined by the effect in Experiment 2 with a half-normal
distribution, i.e., one-tailed, with M = 0, SD = 0.95. The data
was defined by the effect in Experiment 3 with a sample mean
of M = 0.98 and SE = 0.38. When observed actions were
encoded under concurrent action planning load, the size of the
memory error in the Recall own task in Experiment 3 is more
compatible with the size of the effect in the matching condition
in Experiment 2 than the null, Bayes Factor = 15. This means
that the memory error effect observed in the action planning
condition in Experiment 3 is 15 times more compatible with the
memory error effect in Experiment 2 than with a null memory
error effect. This suggests that careful monitoring at retrieval
can reduce source errors during recall, but only does so when
participants were not engaged in a secondary task during the
encoding of actions. We will return to the theoretical implications
of this later.
FIGURE 8 | Standardized mean change between observed and predicted source errors committed in the Recall own task in Experiments 1 through 3 for all
concurrent load conditions. Size of the squares represents the weights of the individual comparisons. The error bars are 95% confidence interval. The polygons
represent the summary effects (fixed effects) of the No load conditions and the Motor system load conditions (Action planning load and Motor execution load).
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Does the Observation Inflation Effect
Generalize?
The first aim of this series of studies was to test if the observation
inflation effect reported by Lindner et al. (2010) generalizes to
a different experimental design, retrieval task and with different
action stimuli. Across three experiments, we have shown a robust
effect of observed actions being falsely retrieved as self-performed
actions.
This suggests that the observation inflation effect is not merely
an effect of verbalisable action phrases, but can also occur with
non-verbalisable, non-object-directed actions. Additionally, it
shows that the observation inflation effect is not solely a result
of the experimental design or retrieval task. In this series of
experiments, we observed robust evidence of observed actions
leading to false claims of self-performance in two versions of a
free recall paradigm.
What Is the Role of the Motor
Component in Source Confusion?
Across three experiments, we tested whether motor activation
during action observation underlies false claims of observed
actions as self-performed. We failed to find evidence for this
account.
First, an account based on internal replicas of observed
actions (Craighero et al., 1999, 2002) does not explain why
self-performed actions were reported as “observed” in all three
experiments, since motor activation during performance always
points toward self-performance, and no conflict between self-
and other performance should arise. Moreover, if mirror neuron
activation was fundamentally responsible for later false memories
of self-performance, such false memories should be disrupted
when observers’ motor systems are occupied with a motor task
at the time of observation. However, direct manipulations of
the extent to which the observed actions could be mirrored
at encoding showed no evidence for the expected reduction
in subsequent source errors, in either Experiment 2 or 3. In
contrast, Lindner et al. (2016) found a reduction in the effect of
observation on false and correct memories of performance when
participants performed incongruent actions during observation
relative to when they performed congruent actions (either
temporally aligned or shifted), suggesting a possible disruption
of motor simulation. We could not confirm that claim for
false memories specifically when testing concurrent action
execution of incongruent actions against both an observation-
only condition and against a non-motor verbal load condition in
our paradigm.
Of course, while our manipulations aimed to disrupt basic
motor execution and higher level action planning, it is possible
that neither sufficiently reduced motor simulation. However,
concurrent motor action, with very similar procedures, has been
shown to impair perception of observed actions (Vetter and
Wolpert, 2000; Hamilton et al., 2004; Zwickel et al., 2007) and
the acquisition of motor skills during imitation and observation
learning (Bach et al., 2014b), and observation of actions has been
shown to influence execution of actions (Kilner et al., 2003; Bach
and Tipper, 2007; Press et al., 2011), suggesting a bidirectional
influence between action perception and execution (for reviews,
see Müsseler, 1999; Schütz-Bosbach and Prinz, 2007; Zwickel and
Prinz, 2012; Avenanti et al., 2013; Campbell and Cunnington,
2017). Indeed, we found that both low-level and high-level motor
system load affected the duplication of a partner’s actions in the
encoding task as well as correct recall of observed actions at test,
confirming that our load manipulation was generally effective.
A second possibility is that we were successful in disrupting
the encoding of the motor component of observed actions
but additionally disrupted the encoding of other memory
components (e.g., due to cognitive load induced by the additional
task). While the disruption of the encoding of the motor
component is associated with a decrease in source errors, this
may have been counteracted by an increase in source errors
due to the overall cognitive load at encoding (Craik, 2014).
However, we would have then expected to see a difference in
the number of source errors between the different concurrent
load conditions. Under such an account, source errors in
the more cognitively demanding action planning load task
should have been more frequent than in the motor execution
task in Experiment 2 and source errors should have been
less frequent in the more motorically taxing action planning
load task than the equally cognitively demanding verbal load
in Experiment 3. We found no evidence for this pattern of
effects.
What do our results mean for the observation inflation effect
in the observation inflation paradigm by Lindner et al. (2010)?
Our results certainly suggest, as shown by these prior studies,
that performing and observing actions leads to source confusion
about actions having been performed or observed. However, we
did not find any evidence for motor encoding of observed actions
impacting the frequency of observed actions falsely remembered
as self-performed. Indeed, Lindner et al. (2016) acknowledge
that while motor simulation may occur during observation,
additional processes such as consolidating information from
different sources of memory are necessary to account for the
inflation effect.
Can the Source Monitoring Framework
Account for the Data?
The source monitoring framework (Johnson et al., 1993) suggests
that the source of any given information is not specifically
encoded but inferred from qualitative features encoded alongside
the item information at test. We propose that the source errors
observed here and in the observation inflation paradigm can
be accounted for in this framework. In such a view, actions
do not have a special status, but are remembered just like any
other event. As such, they are compatible with recent ideomotor
accounts of action and action observation, which argue that
actions are learned, stored and planned on the perceptual level,
in terms of the perceptual effects that go along with them (e.g.,
Hommel et al., 2001), such as the trajectories they produce or the
proprioceptive, visual and auditory feedback they generate.
A source monitoring account can explain all features of the
data in our experiments and has been previously suggested to
account for false memories of self-performance after visualization
of actions (for a discussion, see Henkel and Carbuto, 2008;
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Lindner and Henkel, 2015; also see Leynes and Kakadia, 2013).
Firstly, a source monitoring account can explain why participants
not only misremember observed actions as performed but also
performed actions as observed. Performed and observed actions
both create memories of events that share similarities such
as the body parts used, their trajectories and the manner of
performance. These commonalities predict not only source errors
in the recall own task, but a general confusion about the origin
of encoded actions that would affect both tasks equally, and
more so if these disambiguating aspects are not encoded. Lindner
et al. (2016) suggest that even if motor simulation occurs,
further processes are necessary to result in false claims of self-
performance after observation. It is plausible that evaluation of
motor traces in addition to verbal or cognitive traces is that
consolidation process.
Secondly, our results are compatible with the predictions of
a source monitoring account by showing a decrease in source
confusion when participants evaluate all qualitative features of
individual memories systematically. Indeed, the retrieval task
instructions we used in Experiment 3 did eliminate source
errors. This suggests that allowing participants to withhold
remembered items from report is an effective strategy of
decreasing the reports of source errors when retrieving action
events by preventing participants from neglecting to consider
the source of recalled memories. This is in line with effects
that showed that source performance can be drastically affected
by the instruction and decision required at test (Dodson and
Johnson, 1993; Marsh et al., 1997; Marsh and Hicks, 1998).
Interestingly, finally, that same retrieval task manipulation failed
to show the same elimination of observation inflation when
actions had been encoded under concurrent load. Under source
monitoring account predictions, any distraction that prevents
the encoding of qualitative features of items should result
in a poorer source memory trace, as fewer source-relevant
features might be encoded. Our data suggest that concurrent
load prevented the encoding of source-diagnostic information
for individual actions to such a degree that even systematic
consideration of source at test was unable to overcome that
impairment.
There is a possibility that our paradigm may have led to
increased source confusion on the basis of participants visualizing
themselves from a third-person perspective (Leynes and Kakadia,
2013). However, we deem it unlikely that perspective taking
would have fundamentally given rise to magnitude of source
confusion we observed. Our instructions explicitly discouraged
participants to imagine their own performance from the other
person’s perspective. Given that perspective taking is cognitively
demanding (e.g., Bull et al., 2008; Qureshi et al., 2010; Surtees
et al., 2016), participants would therefore not spontaneously
engage in it, if not motivated by such task demands.
CONCLUSION
This series of studies demonstrates that while we cannot
comment on whether observed actions are mirrored at encoding,
we could not find any evidence for mirroring translating into false
memories of action performance after a delay. Given that a source
monitoring account can account for source confusion of verbal
items and action events as well as the variety of patterns in our
data, it is at this stage not apparent what additional explanatory
contribution a mirror neuron network account could make to an
understanding of source memory for actions, at least for tasks and
actions such as ours.
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